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Abstract 
Task-cuing experiments are usually intended to explore control of task-set. But when 
small stimulus sets are used, they plausibly afford learning of the response associated with a 
combination of cue and stimulus, without reference to tasks. In three experiments we 
presented the typical trials of a task-cuing experiment: a cue (colored shape) followed, after a 
short or long interval, by a digit to which one of two responses was required.  In a "Tasks" 
condition, participants were (as usual) directed to interpret the cue as an instruction to 
perform either an odd/even or a high/low classification task. In a “CSR” condition, to induce 
learning of mappings between cue-stimulus compound and response, participants were: in 
Experiment 1, given standard task instructions and additionally encouraged to learn the CSR 
mappings; in Experiment 2, informed of all the CSR mappings and asked to learn them, 
without standard task instructions; in Experiment 3, required to learn the mappings by trial 
and error. The effects of a task switch, response congruence, preparation, and transfer to a 
new set of stimuli, differed substantially between the conditions in ways indicative of 
classification according to task rules in the Tasks condition, and retrieval of responses 
specific to stimulus-cue combinations  in the CSR conditions. Qualitative features of the latter 
could be captured by an associative learning network. Hence associatively-based compound 
retrieval can serve as the basis for performance with a small stimulus set. But, when 
organisation by tasks is apparent, control via task-set selection is the natural and efficient 
strategy. 
 
Keywords: task-switching, task-cuing, associative learning, conditional discrimination, 
connectionist modeling 
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Human behaviour is often attributed to two types of processing: a set of controlled, 
resource-limited, and effortful processes, and a complementary set of involuntary, resource-
unlimited and effortless processes. These have been referred to as "cognitive" and 
"associative" (McLaren, Green & Mackintosh, 1994) or as "intentional" and "automatic" 
(Jacoby, 1991).  Typically, processes at both levels are thought to operate simultaneously, 
with a degree of independence (see McLaren, Green and Mackintosh, 1994 for a statement of 
this position and Mitchell, De Houwer & Lovibond 2009; Shanks, 2010 for critical reviews of 
it).  In this paper, we examine aspects of performance in a task-switching paradigm often 
assumed to index “executive” or “endogenous” control processes, and ask to what extent 
performance might instead be accounted for by associative learning.  
Reconfiguring one's mind to perform a different task, especially when the 
environment continues to afford the previous task, seems a paradigmatic case of a controlled 
(endogenous, top-down, voluntary) cognitive process. Task-switching experiments intended 
to exercise and measure task-set control have attracted considerable interest over the last two 
decades  (see Kiesel et al 2010; Monsell, 2003; Vandierendonck, Liefooghe, & Verbruggen, 
2010; for reviews). In such experiments, the participant must respond on each trial to a 
stimulus according to one of several task rules The assumption is that the cognitive demands 
of changing between task rules can be examined by comparing performance, or brain activity, 
on trials on which the task changes to trials on which the same task is performed as before, 
other things being equal. We focus here on the task-cuing paradigm (Meiran, 1996, Monsell 
& Mizon, 2006, Sudevan & Taylor, 1987).  
The Task-Cuing Paradigm 
In the task-cuing paradigm, participants are instructed and trained in two or more tasks 
afforded by a set of stimuli. Then, on each trial, a task cue is presented indicating which task 
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the participant is to perform, followed by a stimulus from the available set. The participant is 
required to make an appropriate response as rapidly and accurately as possible. They may 
then receive corrective feedback, there is a pause, the next cue is presented, and so on. The 
experiments we report here required participants to classify a digit as odd/even or high/low 
following a task cue in the form of a colored shape.  Some other examples of task pairs are 
listed in Table 1, to give a flavour of the wide range of realizations of the task-cuing 
paradigm. 
-- Table 1 about here -- 
Among the phenomena seen in such experiments, we focus on three: the task switch 
cost, the response congruence effect and effects of preparation on the switch cost. We first 
review these phenomena, and theoretical interpretations of them in terms of task-set control 
processes (and their limitations). We then consider an alternative class of explanation, 
retrieval from memory of the learned response associated with the combination of cue and 
stimulus.   
The switch cost. This is the often substantial increase in reaction time (and sometimes 
error rate) on trials when the task changes, compared to trials on which the task repeats in the 
same mixed task blocks (see Kiesel et al 2010; Monsell, 2003, Vandierendonck et al, 2010, 
for reviews).   
The reduction in switch cost with preparation. The task-cuing paradigm allows one to 
manipulate the time available for preparation by varying the cue-stimulus interval (CSI) while 
keeping the time since (and hence any carry-over from) the previous task execution constant 
(Meiran, 1996). Provided participants are adequately motivated, an opportunity for 
preparation improves performance overall —as one might expect from a century of 
experiments on fore-period effects and phasic alertness (Niemi & Näätanen, 1981; Nobre, 
Correa & Coull, 2007), and also because a long enough CSI removes the dual task costs of 
Forrest Monsell & McLaren 
 5 
processing cue and stimulus simultaneously. Critically, however, an opportunity for 
preparation also reduces the switch cost. This reduction in switch cost (RISC) with 
preparation is frequently interpreted as resulting from top-down control operations: a long 
CSI allows subjects to accomplish at least some part of the task-set reconfiguration that 
would otherwise have to be done after stimulus onset. Doing it in advance may remove from 
the RT the processing time consumed by such processes (Rogers & Monsell, 1995); it may 
reduce interference due to competition from the other task (because of advance activation of 
the relevant task-set and/or suppression of the irrelevant task set); it may reduce interference 
due to concurrence of reconfiguration processes and stimulus processing after the stimulus; it 
may do any combination of these possibilities. 
However, there appears to be a limit to how much can be achieved in readying the 
system for a change of task through advance preparation. Preparation almost never eliminates 
the switch cost. As the CSI increases, the RT switch cost usually decreases to an asymptote, 
typically reached at a CSI between 500 and 1000 ms (Meiran, 1996; Meiran, Chorev & Sapir, 
2000; Monsell & Mizon, 2006). One account of this asymptotic "residual" cost is that it is due 
to some irreducible persisting activation of the previous task-set - "task set inertia" (Allport, 
Styles & Hsieh, 1994; Meiran 1996; Yeung & Monsell, 2003; Yeung, Nystrom, Aronson & 
Cohen, 2006). Another (not mutually exclusive) possibility is that the stimulus associatively 
reactivates task-sets previously associated with it, including competing task-sets (Koch & 
Allport, 2006; Rubin & Meiran, 2005; Waszak, Hommel & Allport, 2003. A third possibility 
is that task-set preparation simply "fails to engage" on a proportion of trials (De Jong, 2000; 
Nieuwenhuis & Monsell, 2002 but see Brown, Lehmann & Poboka, 2006). Another measure 
of the limits of preparation is that merely preparing to do Task A, without actually performing 
it, is not sufficient to cause a switch cost when Task B follows on the next trial; Schuch & 
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Koch (2003) showed that aborting the response with a “no-go” signal abolished the switch 
cost on the next trial. 
The response congruence effect. In many task-switching experiments the same small 
set of responses is used for both tasks, and all or many of the stimuli are “bivalent”: they 
afford both tasks. For example, if the two tasks are odd/even and high/low classifications of a 
digit, the left key might be used for "odd" and "low" and the right for "even" and "high". 
Congruent stimuli (e.g. 1) would receive the same response irrespective of task, while for 
incongruent stimuli (e.g. 7) the appropriate response depends on the task in play. Congruent 
stimuli are usually responded to faster than incongruent stimuli, (e.g. Kiesel, Wendt & Peters, 
2007; Monsell & Mizon, 2006; Rogers & Monsell, 1995), suggesting that when an irrelevant 
task-set has recently been active and/or must be kept available for the next switch, it is not 
completely disabled — its S-R mappings still mediate some degree of response activation, 
which either combines (congruent) or competes (incongruent) with the response activation 
generated by the current task's S-R rules. The congruence effect is usually amplified on task-
switch trials, suggesting that persistence (or reactivation) of the previous trial's S-R rules is at 
least part of the problem causing the switch cost. But whereas the switch cost is transient, 
with performance recovering to asymptote within 3 or 4 trials of an unpredictable switch, the 
effects of congruence are much more persistent (e.g. Monsell, Sumner & Waters, 2003).  
A compound-retrieval interpretation. Our purpose in this article is not to decide 
among these various task-set reconfiguration (TSR) accounts of how task-set control 
processes and their limitations might generate the phenomena in task-switching experiments, 
but to contrast them, as a class, with an account of performance in this situation as based on 
retrieval from memory of the learned response associated with the combination of cue and 
stimulus. Most task-cuing experiments use a small pool of stimuli that repeatedly recur 
throughout the experiment, and just one or two cues per task (see Table 1 for examples).  In 
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such circumstances, it is a logical option for the participant simply to learn a combination of 
simple and conditional discriminations (as they are sometimes described in animal learning 
experiments, see e.g. Mackintosh, 1974). For example, if the task cue is a background color, 
the participant might learn a set of contingencies of the form: “pink background+7  right 
key”, and then on each trial retrieve from memory the response associated with the current 
cue + stimulus pair. Note that for congruent stimuli, only simple S-R associations need 
logically be learned: e.g. “3  left”.  Hence, although the experimenter may construe the 
experiment as one that requires switches between task-sets, the participant might (after 
learning the contingencies through practice) be operating with just a single task-set: retrieve 
the learned response associated with the cue + stimulus combination presented. We will refer 
to this generic strategy as CSR learning (where C stands simultaneously for "cue", 
"contextual" and "conditional").  
There are numerous examples of associative learning models that could, in principle, 
learn the contingencies for the task-cuing paradigm in the way described above (e.g. 
McLaren, 1993, 1994; Pearce, 1987), i.e. by forming mappings from the cue+stimulus to the 
response, though they have not been applied to the task-cuing paradigm. The behaviour of 
one such model will be discussed later and illustrated with a simulation in the General 
Discussion section.  
Another example of a compound retrieval theory was explicitly proposed for the task-
cuing paradigm by Logan & Bundesen (2003) and developed in a number of papers 
(Arrington & Logan, 2004, Logan, Schneider & Bundesen, 2007, Schneider & Logan, 2005, 
2007). This account conceptualises performance in the task-cuing paradigm as based on 
retrieval from memory of the response maximally activated by the combination of encoded 
cue and encoded stimulus: the cue and the stimulus act as joint retrieval cues. Arrington and 
Logan (2004) distinguish two such compound retrieval strategies. The first they describe as 
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”episodic”: cue-stimulus pairs may be associated with responses in a relatively un-interpreted 
manner; this requires several repetitions of cue and target pairs before reliable associations 
develop, but this is plausible for the typical task-cuing experiment with a small set of stimuli 
(such as 8 digits) and one or two cues per task. But when large stimulus sets are used, there is 
no opportunity for such learning, yet performance is good and the characteristic switch costs 
and preparation phenomena are nevertheless observed (e.g. Arrington & Logan, 2004; 
Monsell & Mizon, 2006; Waszak et al, 2003). In later versions of the model therefore (e.g. 
Schneider and Logan, 2007) the cue is held to be encoded not as a specific stimulus, but as a 
task-name mediator (such as “parity”, in a paradigm where there is a single stimulus object 
such as a digit, or “word”, in a paradigm where one of two objects – e.g. a word and a face – 
must be responded to1). It is the compound of mediator and stimulus that jointly retrieve the 
relevant response from memory. If the attribute to be discriminated is familiar (such as odd-
even) no new learning, except to translate the cue to the mediator, may be needed.  In one 
sense this admits a task-representation to the model.  But the critical difference remains that it 
assumes no change in task-set during a block; on each trial the participant “simply” retrieves 
the response associated with the encoded cue and encoded stimulus 
Where then do “task-switch” costs come from?  Logan and Bundesen’s (2003) starting 
point was that using only one cue for each task confounded the effect of changing or 
repeating a task with the possible effect of changing or repeating the cue on successive trials.  
Logan and Bundesen (2003) used two cues per task, which allows three categories of trial 
sequence: the cue repeats; the cue changes but the task remains the same; the cue and the task 
change.   Contrasting the first two estimates the effect of a cue change, which they found to 
                                                
1 The quotation marks should not be taken to imply that the mediator is verbal: it may be a 
more abstract representation. 
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be large. Contrasting the last two estimated the effect of a task change, which they found to 
be small. They therefore proposed that what had previously been construed as task-switch 
costs arise largely because cue encoding is primed when the same cue was encoded on the 
previous trial. The distribution of the time required to encode the cue  (which they model as 
exponential) is assumed to extend well into the post-stimulus interval when the CSI is short, 
and Logan et al assume that compound retrieval waits until cue encoding is complete. Hence 
the shorter the CSI, the more often and longer on average CSR retrieval has to wait for cue 
encoding, and the greater the contribution of cue priming to performance. Thus the driver of 
the RISC effect is the priming of cue-encoding. 
Although Logan and Bundesen’s (2003) original findings suggested that almost all the 
apparent cost of a “task-switch” could be attributed to a change of cue rather than task, other 
studies using two cues per task have shown that there can be a substantial cost when the task 
changes, with cue change controlled (e.g. Mayr & Kliegl, 2003; Monsell & Mizon, 2006; 
Scheider and Logan, 2007), and also clear reductions in those task-change costs with 
preparation (e.g. Monsell & Mizon, 2006). Schneider and Logan (2005, 2007) elaborated 
their priming account, proposing that, even when there are two cues per task, the two cues 
assigned to a task prime each others’ encoding. This is either because signalling the same task 
associates them together, and there is associative priming (Schneider & Logan, 2005), or 
because the effective encoding of the cue is the mediator referred to above, and it is easier to 
generate the mediator if the same mediator was generated on the previous trial (Logan & 
Bundesen, 2004; Schneider & Logan, 2007). 
Objections to the compound retrieval model. 
Logan and colleagues’ compound-retrieval model has excited controversy because it 
rejects what is for most users of the task-cuing paradigm its raison d’être: the hope that we 
can use it to measure the process and/or limitations of endogenous cognitive control as 
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applied to the selection of task-sets. A number of objections have been made to the model. 
Monsell and Mizon (2006) discuss the plausibility of some of the assumptions, and noted that 
the marked variation in relative sizes of task and cue change effects across experiments 
seemed to be driven more by the probability of a task switch than the degree of association 
between the cues assigned to a task, or the likelihood of a task mediator being used. Mayr 
(2006) also found that participants were sensitive to the task-switch probability but not to 
learning the specific cue-stimulus pairs. Altmann (2006) was able to show that there was still 
a switch cost present on the second trial after a switch, even when a cue was not presented. 
Brass & von Crammon (2004) showed differential activation of the left IFJ, the right IFG and 
the right intra parietal sulcus related to task changes but not cue changes, again suggesting 
that performance is mediated by task-sets. The evidence most problematic for the account of 
the switch cost in terms of compound retrieval and priming of cue encoding comes from 
Logan’s lab.  Arrington, Logan and Schneider (2007) required subjects to make an overt 
response to the cue as soon as they had identified the stimulus dimension to be classified. 
This response then triggered presentation of the stimulus. RT to the cue should now include 
encoding time, and show priming effects, and cue encoding time should be excluded from RT 
to the stimulus. In fact there were substantial task-switch costs in the second RT, not in the 
first RT.   
Regardless of such difficulties, the Logan/Bundesen/Arrington/Schneider compound-
retrieval account – or at least the “episodic” version of it that applies to small stimulus sets – 
provides a well-specified example of a theory according to which the phenomena of cued 
task-switching can in principle be accounted for by CSR learning and retrieval, rather than 
processes of task-set selection and control. It is worth noting, however, that although this 
compound retrieval theory requires that CSR learning of some kind must have taken place, its 
authors say little about the learning process, nor have their experiments assessed it.  Yet the 
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amount of practice given before data are collected in such experiments has typically been 
quite small. We analyse below in more detail what has to be learned. 
Rationale for the current experiments. 
In the present studies, we took seriously the general proposition that CSR learning and 
retrieval is a plausible strategy for performance in the typical task-cuing paradigm. We 
maximised the viability of this strategy by keeping the number of stimuli very small (four to 
start with) to minimise the number of CSR associations to be learned. The experiment used a 
standard task-cuing paradigm, with a task cue (a coloured shape) preceding the digit stimulus 
and specifying an odd-even or a high-low classification rule. In the Tasks condition, 
participants were given standard instructions to interpret the cue as indicating which of two 
classification tasks to perform in response to the stimulus. Participants in the CSR condition 
received identical trial sequences, but were encouraged by instructional or training 
manipulations (which differed across the three experiments) to adopt a CSR strategy. The 
logic is straightforward. If participants in a standard task-cuing experiment (as represented by 
the Tasks condition) naturally use a CSR strategy, then encouraging them to do so in the CSR 
condition should not produce any qualitative difference between their performance in Task 
and CSR conditions (though possibly participants might learn CSR associations faster if we 
push them explicitly to do so). If, however, we get a qualitatively different pattern of results 
in the Tasks and CSR conditions, and evidence consistent with CSR learning in the CSR 
condition, this would suggest that typical performance in the standard task-cuing experiment 
cannot be reduced to compound retrieval. It would also suggest properties diagnostic of these 
two strategies, and allow us to probe their relative efficiency.  
The Dreisbach et al. experiments. 
A related instructional manipulation has been used by Dreisbach and colleagues 
(Dreisbach, Goschke & Haider, 2006; Dreisbach, Goschke & Haider, 2007; Dreisbach & 
Forrest Monsell & McLaren 
 12 
Haider, 2008; Dreisbach & Haider, 2009, see Dreisbach, 2012 for a review) to contrast a 
classification performed according to a task-rule with the same classification accomplished 
by means of individual S-R rules.  Participants are given a set of individual S-R rules for 
binary classification of a set of stimuli.  The stimulus set is designed so that an additional 
task-rule-based classification strategy is available, but it is sufficiently non-obvious that 
participants do not notice it until it is drawn to their attention. For example, participants were 
taught to classify a set of 4 red and 4 green words with what appeared to be eight arbitrary S-
R mappings (half of each color left, half right).  In fact, hard-to-spot task-based rules, cued by 
the color, were available: for a red word, the response was specified by whether the word 
began with a consonant or vowel, and for a green word, by whether it referred to an animal or 
not. Participants told these task-rules at the outset showed costs when the color switched, 
uninformed participants did not, and late-informed participants showed only modest switch 
costs after the rule was given. Interestingly, performance was notably slower, especially to 
start with, in the early-informed group who were using the task rule. That is, under these 
conditions, where the stimuli are univalent — i.e. each word associated with one response, so 
that only S-R, not CSR, associations have to be learned — using the task-rules seems to add 
difficulty. Why then did the participants tipped off to the task-rule elect to use it if it leads to 
worse performance? Dreisbach and Haider (2008, 2009) report further experiments which 
suggest that one advantage of using a task-set rule is that it shields against irrelevant sources 
of variation that perturbs the performance of those using individual S-R rules. For example,  
Dreisbach and Haider’s (2008) participants had to classify a word describing an item of 
clothing by whether it was worn on the top or the bottom of the body. Behind the word was a 
picture of an animal facing in a direction compatible or incompatible with the response.  
Using a task strategy reduced the effects of (irrelevant) directional compatibility.   
The associative structure of the standard task-cuing experiment.   
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In Dreisbach et al.'s experiments, each stimulus was associated with only one response 
and presented only in one task, so that "simple" S-R associative learning would suffice. 
Hence, for their participants, using task-rules can be said to add unnecessary complexity. In 
spite of this, the evidence suggests they are used if offered at the outset, and confer some 
benefits in particular circumstances (e.g. in the presence of irrelevant information). Our 
experiments instead address the more common task-cuing paradigm in which all or many of 
the stimuli are bivalent: they afford responses in both tasks. Not only is this the situation 
which has revealed standard phenomena of task-switching, such as response congruence 
effects, and the one for which theoretical accounts, including the compound retrieval idea, 
have mainly been generated. It is also a situation in which switching between classification 
tasks, contingent on the cue, is plausibly a simpler strategy than CSR learning for solving the 
problem the experiment poses to the participant. 
Considered from an associative learning point of view, bivalent stimuli add 
complexity because congruent and incongruent trials have different associative structures. 
Congruent stimuli can be classified by attending to a single feature (e.g. XA R, YA R, 
XBL, YBL; where X and Y are cues for two tasks, A and B are congruent stimuli, R is a 
right response and L is a left response); the cue can be ignored. In contrast, incongruent trials 
require what the associative learning literature calls a "biconditional discrimination" (e.g. 
XCR, YCL, XDL, YDR; where C and D are the incongruent stimuli). There are 
likely to be differences in the rate of acquisition of these sub-problems. Biconditional 
discriminations are particularly hard for human participants to learn (Harris & Livesey, 
2008). For example, Livesey, Thorwart, De Fina & Harris (2011) in two experiments 
demonstrated that for human participants, biconditional discriminations were harder to learn 
than component discriminations (i.e. A  R and B  L). We therefore expect performance 
mediated by CSR learning to show a substantial effect of congruence, but for reasons 
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different to those leading us to expect a congruence effect when people switch between task-
sets. 
Does an associative analysis of CSR learning predict any “switch cost”? We will 
argue that it does, particularly for the incongruent trials, due to facilitation of retrieval by 
learning on the previous trial (rather than by facilitation of cue encoding as in the Schneider 
and Logan, 2005, model). This analysis is backed up by the results of simulations of which 
we will report an illustrative example after the experiments. For now we offer an intuitive 
rationale. An advantage for “task-repeat” trials2 can derive from the fact that the mappings 
between cue, stimulus and response are, to some extent, primed by learning on the previous 
trial, and this priming will be more facilitatory for "task-repeat" trials than for "task-switch" 
trials. Even though we take the precaution of using two cues per task, changing one 
dimension of the cue (Experiments 1 & 2) or the entire cue (Experiment 3) used to signal the 
task in play on every trial, our simulations suggest the intermediate representations formed to 
carry the mappings from cue and stimulus to response in a multi-layer network tend to 
combine the cues that signal the same response for a given stimulus so that they activate one 
intermediate representation — i.e. the network creates cue equivalence (Honey & Ward-
Robinson, 2002). For incongruent stimuli this means that the cues for the same task will be 
treated equivalently.  For incongruent stimuli, there is no benefit from this recent learning 
when the task switches, as now different intermediate representations and different pathways 
will be involved. The priming that results on repeat trials is thus due not to persistence of 
                                                
2 We use the terms “task-switch” and “task-repeat” to define trial sequences even when 
considering the performance of a hypothetical participant unaware of the task-cuing construal 
of the trial sequence; the quotation marks signal this usage. 
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activation over trials, but to the increments in the connections between input, intermediate 
and output representations that took place on the previous trial.   
Given that we expect some switch cost in the CSR condition, what about the reduction 
in switch cost (RISC) effect? According to the Logan and Bundesen (2003) account, this 
arises from the priming of cue encoding, and we should expect to see it in the CSR, just as in 
the Tasks condition. But the basic idea of associative CSR learning does not by itself predict 
a RISC effect, indeed, it predicts none: the cue alone cannot usefully pre-activate any S-R or 
CSR associations because each cue is equally associated with both responses. Thus a basic 
associative account predicts no benefit of increasing the preparation interval on any "switch 
cost" that might be seen. Any advantage from a long CSI should be limited to generic 
preparation to process the stimulus and respond, i.e. a main effect of foreperiod. Moreover, 
while it could be argued that a long CSI removes the need simultaneously to process cue and 
stimulus, it is also possible that simultaneous presentation of the cue and the stimulus in the 
CSR condition might benefit CSR learning by facilitating configural processing of the cue 
and stimulus.  
Task-switching in monkeys.   
Another basis for predictions in our CSR condition is research by Stoet and Snyder 
(2003a, 2003b, 2007), who gave Rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatto) thousands of trials in a 
simple task-switching paradigm. Without language to mediate the development of a task-set 
strategy (cf. Goschke, 2000), and after so much training, it seems likely that the monkeys 
were using a CSR strategy developed through trial-and-error learning. Nevertheless, Stoet 
and Snyder (2007) found a small switch cost in the monkeys; human participants (who 
received very much less training) showed a much larger cost; this is in line with the 
predictions about the switch cost made above. Stoet and Snyder (2003b) did find a RISC 
effect in the two monkeys they studied. However, they used only one cue per task, so that a 
Forrest Monsell & McLaren 
 16 
change in the cue to be processed was confounded with a change in task. In these 
circumstances having more time to process the cue before the stimulus appeared might well 
benefit the monkey less on a repeat than it would on a switch trial (as Logan & Bundesen, 
2003, suggested). This does not bear upon our prediction that if cue change and task change 
are un-confounded, then little or no RISC effect will be observed when using a CSR strategy. 
Stoet and Snyder (2007) also found a large congruence effect in the monkeys they tested, 
supporting the prediction that approaching the experiment without a task representation 
should indeed yield a large congruence effect.  
Transfer to a new stimulus set.    
In addition to examining switch costs, RISC effects and congruence effects, our 
experiments also included a manipulation especially relevant to assessing learning. Towards 
the end of each experiment, after practice on just four of the digits, the stimulus set was 
changed to a new set of four. This manipulation should have a more detrimental effect on 
CSR-based performance than on performance mediated by task-sets.  If one is applying 
categorical task rules, they continue to apply in the transfer test, and the participant must 
merely get used to applying them to a novel set of stimuli; this might be expected to slow 
performance transiently, but not differentially on task-switch and task-repeat trials. However, 
in the CSR condition new stimuli require the learning of new S-R and CSR associations.  
This leads one to expect a more dramatic impairment on the transfer test in the CSR 
condition.  One would also predict quicker post-transfer recovery for the congruent stimuli, 
for the same reason as one predicts faster learning of the congruent stimuli during training. 
However there is no reason to expect performance on the transfer test to regress all the way 
back to the level seen at the beginning of the experiment. Training optimizes multiple aspects 
of performance such as efficiency of stimulus encoding and response readiness. We would 
thus expect the decrement in performance resulting from the need for new learning in the 
Forrest Monsell & McLaren 
 17 
CSR condition to exceed and differ in pattern from the transitory adjustment to new stimuli 
expected in the tasks condition.  
The experiments.   
The three experiments all compared a group receiving standard task-cuing instructions 
(the Tasks group) to a CSR group who received the same trials, but were encouraged to learn 
and use CSR associations. In Experiment 1, the CSR participants were given the same 
standard task-set instructions as the Tasks group, and were merely exhorted, in addition, to 
learn S-R and CSR mappings. In Experiment 2, the instructions given to the CSR group made 
no reference to high/low and odd/even classification tasks; participants were simply told how 
to respond on the basis of individual CSR mappings, made available for learning as a list at 
the beginning of the experiment. Finally, Experiment 3 required the CSR participants to learn 
responses by trial and error alone, much like Stoet and Snyder's monkeys.  
Of course, in both Experiments 2 and 3, it was perfectly possible for participants in 
the CSR group to induce and use a task-set rule, even though they were not told to use such a 
rule or to look for one.  Likewise, it was possible for participants in the Tasks condition to 
notice and then strive to learn and use CSR associations instead of or as well as the tasks.  
Hence in Experiments 2 and 3 we interviewed the participants in a post-experiment 
debriefing, to enable us to select a sufficient group of participants in each condition who 
appeared to be unaware of the alternative strategy.  We leave for future research the idea that, 
given common conceptions of the automaticity of associative learning, we might expect 
participants who do not explicitly notice that they can learn S-R and CSR rules to learn them 
nonetheless.  
Experiment 1 
On each trial the participant saw a task cue (a square or diamond filled with pink or 
blue) in the centre of the screen. After a 100 or 1200 ms CSI, one of four digits appeared 
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superimposed on the colored shape. The task, odd/even or low/high classification, was 
specified by the color of the cue for some participants, the shape for others. Either the shape 
or color changed on every trial, in such a way that the task changed on half the trials.  All the 
participants received standard task-set instructions; half were also encouraged to learn the 
CSR mappings. 
Method 
Participants  
The participants were 48 psychology undergraduates (age range 18-35) at the 
University of Exeter. Participants were paid for their participation. 
Apparatus and stimuli.  
The experiment was programmed in SuperLab (v1.5) and presented on a Macintosh 
Performa computer with a 13″ screen. Participants were tested individually. The task cue was 
a blue or pink diamond or square, displayed centrally.  On the next trial one of the dimensions 
of the cue changed to the other value; for half the subjects in each group the color signalled 
the task, for the other half the shape. The side of the square was ~5.2° of visual angle; the 
diamond was the same shape rotated by 45°. The blue shapes had RGB values of (153, 204, 
255) whilst the pink shapes had RGB values of (255, 153, 153). The digit was displayed in 
the centre of the shape in Geneva font, and was ~1.7° high.  
Design.  
The experiment had a between-subjects factor of instruction (CSR versus task-set), 
and within-subjects factors of trial type (switch versus repeat), response congruence 
(congruent versus incongruent), and CSI (long, i.e. 1200 ms versus short i.e. 100 ms). After 
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practice and instruction, a session consisted of 14 blocks half of 61, half of 63 trials3. For the 
first 10 of these blocks participants saw only four of the eight digits (1,4,7,8 for half the 
participants, 2,3,6,9, for the rest). For blocks 11-14, the stimulus set changed to the other four 
digits, as a test of transfer of training. The trial sequences were fully randomized with the 
following constraints. Switch and repeat trials were equally frequent. The lengths of runs of 
trials on the same task were controlled to approximate within a block the expected 
distribution of run lengths for a binomial sequence with p(switch)=0.5. Each digit appeared 
equally often on switch, first repeat and second repeat trials in a run, and then randomly on 
other trials with the constraint that each digit appeared roughly equally often during the 
experiment.   
Procedure.  
Participants sat with their eyes about 50 cm from the computer screen, left and right 
index fingers on the “z” and "/" keys of the computer keyboard. All participants were given 
onscreen instructions that introduced the odd-even and high-low classification tasks, and 
explained how they were cued. 
There were four single-task practice blocks of 20 trials, one with a long-CSI and then 
one with a short-CSI for each task. There followed two blocks of 30 trials to practice 
switching between the tasks, first with a long-CSI and then with a short-CSI.  During the 
practice blocks all 8 digits appeared. After practice, the CSR group of participants received 
additional instructions (see Appendix A) designed to encourage them to learn and use 
“pairings” such as "Square + 2  RIGHT". Half the participants were assigned to the CSR 
                                                
3 The small variation in block length is a by-product of generating trial sequences with an 
algorithm that ensures the distribution of run lengths per task approximates overall to 
binomial expectation.  
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condition and the other half to the Tasks condition. For the reader's benefit, Figure 1 
illustrates the mappings used under both conditions in a form that emphasizes either the 
hierarchical Tasks structure or the "flat" list of CSR mappings, for a participant for whom the 
cue's shape was the task cue.   
-- Figure 1 about here -- 
Participants then began the main part of the experiment. CSI alternated by block, with 
the starting CSI balanced across participants. In order to keep the response-stimulus interval 
(RSI) constant, the response-cue interval was 1600 ms in the short blocks, and 500 ms in the 
long-CSI blocks. If the response was correct, the next trial began immediately. If the 
participant pressed the wrong key, “WRONG!” was displayed (in red) for an extra 1500 ms, 
before the experiment continued; if he/she failed to respond within 4000 ms, “Time Out” 
appeared (in black). At the end of a block the participant’s mean RT and number of errors for 
that block were displayed. Participants rested between blocks for as long as they wished, and 
were advised to stretch their legs after block 8. Participants were informed after block 10 that 
the digits they were going to see would be different. 
Results 
In all the experiments, trials following an error were excluded from the analysis, and 
error trials were excluded from the RT analysis. We characterize the effects of practice in 
terms of changes over block pairs; each pair contained one short- and one long-CSI block 
whose order was counterbalanced over participants. 
-- Figure 2 about here -- 
As illustrated in Figure 2, participants in both the Tasks (shown right) and CSR 
(shown left) conditions showed an improvement in performance from block pair 1 to 5. 
Although the CSR group, who received the extra instructions to learn CSR associations, 
started off slower and less accurate, by the end of block pair 5 there was little difference in 
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overall performance between the groups, with the CSR group having a median correct RT4 of 
685 ms and 5.21% errors, compared to 676 ms and 4.83% errors for the Tasks group. Figure 
3 summarizes three main outcomes of this experiment: a larger switch cost in the Tasks 
condition than the CSR condition, a RISC effect in the Tasks condition but not in the CSR 
condition, and a much smaller congruence effect in the Tasks condition than in the CSR 
condition. Figure 2 also shows how performance was perturbed by the introduction of novel 
stimuli at block pair 6 (the transfer test): the perturbation appears more marked and persistent 
for the CSR group. Each of the effects and interactions (switch cost, RISC effect and 
congruence effect) discussed in the introduction will now be considered in turn, first for the 
main experiment (block pairs 1-5), then for the transfer blocks.   
Block pairs 1-5 
To test the critical interactions of instruction condition with effects of a task switch, 
congruence and preparation time, a mixed ANOVA with the factors: task switch (repeat, 
switch), congruence (congruent, incongruent), CSI (long or short), block pair (1,2,3,4 or 5) 
and instruction condition (Tasks versus CSR) was run on both the median correct reaction 
time (RT) and percent errors, and followed up by separate ANOVAs for the two groups 
where appropriate. The salient contrasts are shown in Figure 3.  Effect sizes are reported as 
generalised eta squared  ηG2 (Olejnik & Algina, 2003) as  recommended for designs with 
repeated measures (Bakeman, 2005). 
-- Figure 3 about here -- 
                                                
4 In all experiments we repeated the same analyses with mean RT:  effects were slightly 
noisier but qualitatively very similar.  We note in footnotes two cases where a critical effect 
that reached significance in the analysis of medians did not reach significance for the means. 
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Task switches and instruction. The Tasks group had a larger RT switch cost (76 ± 7.57 
ms)5 than the CSR group (40 ± 5.93 ms), F(1,46) = 7.28, p < .05, = 0.00124, but the switch 
costs in both the Tasks condition, F(1,23) = 69.8, p < .001, = 0.0329, and the CSR 
condition, F(1,23) = 39.4, p < .001, = 0.00898, were reliable. For errors, the overall main 
effect of a task switch was reliable, F(1,46) = 39.7, p < .001, = 0.0349, (repeat: 4.42%, 
switch: 7.45%), but there was no interaction with instruction: the switch cost was 3.06 ± 
0.58% for the Tasks group and 3.01 ± 0.41% for the CSR group. Hence the switch cost over 
these blocks was greater in the Tasks than in the CSR condition (see Figure 3). 
Preparation and instruction. As Figure 3 shows, preparation reduced the switch cost 
in the Tasks group RT from 97 ms in the short-CSI blocks to 65 ms in the long-CSI blocks, a 
reduction of  32 ± 10.3 ms. There was no reduction in the CSR group; their switch cost was 
37 ms in the short-CSI blocks and 42 ms in the long-CSI blocks, a difference of -5 ± 8.72 ms. 
The interaction was marginally reliable F(1,46) = 2.54, p = 0.12, = 0.000428,. Separate 
analyses revealed a significant interaction of CSI and task switch in the Tasks condition, 
F(1,23) = 5.39, p < .05, = 0.00244, but not in the CSR condition, F < 1. For error rates, a 
similar pattern was evident. For the Tasks group there was a larger switch cost in the short-
CSI (3.85%) than the long-CSI blocks (2.26%), a reduction of 1.59 ± 0.49% For the CSR 
group the switch cost was 2.45% for the short-CSI blocks, and 3.56% for the long-CSI, a 
difference of -1.11 ± 0.65% This interaction was reliable, F(1,46) = 4.96, p < .05, = 
                                                
5  mean and standard error of contrast 
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0.000704. Hence there was a clear RISC effect for the Tasks group, but none for the CSR 
group, and the RISC effect differed between groups. 
However, both groups benefited more generally from the opportunity to prepare, as 
we may see by examining task-repeat trials alone. RT in the Tasks group was 120 ± 22.7 ms 
faster after a long-CSI (627 ms) than after a short (747 ms), F(1,23) = 30.1, p < .001, = 
0.105. A similar but less marked effect was seen in the CSR condition, where repeat trials 
were 30 ± 11.9 faster in the long-CSI (714 ms) than in the short (744 ms), F(1,23) = 9.63, p < 
.01, = 0.00842. The difference in this effect between the two groups was significant, 
F(1,46) = 11.7, p < .01, = 0.0130. This effect was not significant in the errors for either 
group. 
Congruence and instruction. RT and error rates showed a substantially larger effect of 
congruence (incongruent minus congruent) in the CSR group (299 ± 26.3 ms, 9.28 ± 0.95%) 
than in the Tasks group (138 ± 16.9 ms, 7.74 ± 0.82%); the interaction was highly reliable for 
RTs, F(1,46) = 12.4, p < 0.01, = 0.0220, but not error rates. In separate analyses for the 
two groups, the congruence effect was reliable for the Tasks group, F(1, 23) = 32.2, p < .001, 
= 0.0725, for RT; F(1,23) = 46.0, p < .001, = 0.208, for errors; and for the CSR group: 
F(1,23) = 61.6, p < .001, = 0.217, in RTs; F(1,23) = 60.9, p < .001, = 0.256, in errors. 
Acquisition effects. As may be seen in Figure 2, overall performance evidently 
improved from block pair 1 to 5, and this was reliable for RTs F(4,184) = 184, p < .001, = 
0.0648. Although the RT improvement looks greater for the CSR group, the difference was 
not reliable, F < 1. For the error data the CSR group improved more from block pair 1 to 5 
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than the Tasks group, F(4,184) = 3.38, p < .05, = 0.00556. Separate analyses revealed 
significant effects of block pair in both the Tasks, F(4,92) = 2.73, p < .05, = 0.00817, and 
CSR groups, F(4,92) = 10.0, p < .001, = 0.0341. 
The associative account outlined in the introduction predicted that congruent stimuli 
should be learned more rapidly than incongruent stimuli. This is supported by the interaction 
between block pair, congruence and instructions in the error rates, F(4,184) = 3.90, p < .05, 
= 0.00586, driven largely by an interaction between block pair and congruence in the CSR 
group, F(4,92) = 7.84, p < 0.001, = 0.0228, but not in the Tasks group, F < 1, and by the 
non-reliable interaction in the RTs (see Figure 2). For the CSR group, performance on the 
congruent stimuli appears to asymptote in the error rates early on, and after three block pairs 
in the RTs, while the much poorer performance on the incongruent stimuli continues to 
improve steadily. For the Tasks group, there was a more modest improvement with practice, 
and it was not obviously different for congruent and incongruent stimuli. 
Other significant interactions. In task-switching experiments, the effect of 
incongruence is usually amplified by a task switch, and vice versa, and this is expected on a 
control account if the irrelevant task-set is more active on switch than repeat trials. The 
switch cost was larger for incongruent (Tasks: 95 ms, CSR: 75 ms) than for congruent 
stimuli, (Tasks: 57 ms, CSR:  4 ms), and this effect was much more pronounced in the CSR 
condition than in the Tasks condition. Separate analyses revealed a significant interaction in 
the CSR group, F(1,23) = 59.7, p < .001, = 0.00514, but not in the Tasks group.  In the 
error data the pattern was similar.  Again there were larger switch costs for the incongruent 
stimuli (Tasks: 4.96%, CSR:  5.68%) than for the congruent stimuli (Tasks: 1.15%. CSR: 
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0.34%). This did not interact with instructions. Separate analyses revealed a significant effect 
in both the CSR group, F(1,23) = 18.3, p < .001, = 0.0240, and the Tasks group, F(1,23) = 
19.2, p < .001, = 0.0190. 
Inasmuch as task-set preparation might be expected to reduce the impact of the 
irrelevant S-R mapping, one might expect a smaller congruence effect at the longer CSI. In 
the task-switching literature such an interaction has sometimes been observed, but sometimes 
not (Monsell & Mizon, 2006; Kiesel et al, 2010). In the present experiment, the congruence 
effect was indeed larger with a short CSI (Tasks: 170 ms; CSR: 315 ms), than with a long 
CSI (Tasks: 105 ms; CSR: 283 ms), F(1,46) = 11.3, p < .01, = 0.000643, but this change 
did not differ much between the instruction conditions: this effect was not significant in the 
errors. 
 The transfer test 
In order to examine the effect of transfer from one set of stimuli to another, 
performance in block pair 5 was compared with performance in block pair 6, using a mixed 
ANOVA with the factors: task switch (repeat or switch), congruence, CSI, block pair (5 or 6) 
and instruction condition. This seems the most straightforward of the several possible 
measures of transfer. Only factors that interacted with block pair will be discussed.  
As expected, the CSR group was more affected by the transfer to new stimuli; their 
mean RT (error rate) increased by 137 ± 20.9 ms (2.41 ± 0.59%) as compared to the Tasks 
group’s 55 ± 20.3 ms (1.15 ± 0.47%). The interaction was significant for RT, F(1,46) = 4.13, 
p < .05, = 0.00753, but not error rate, F(1,46) = 1.36, p = 0.25, = 0.00163, although 
there was a main effect of transfer in the errors, F(1,46) = 10.7, p < .01, = 0.0128. Under 
both instruction conditions transfer to new stimuli increased the switch cost, by 48 ± 7.6 ms 
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(1.17 ± 0.58%) in the Tasks group, and 64 ± 6.0 ms (-0.23 ± 0.41%) in the CSR group. In the 
RTs there was a significant interaction between block pair and task switch, F(1,46) = 16.6, p 
< .001, = 0.00348, but not in the error rate F < 1. This interaction was separately 
significant in RTs in the Tasks, F(1,23 ) = 9.70, p < .001, = 0.00329 and CSR groups, 
F(1,23) = 7.99, p < .05, = 0.00373, but in the errors for neither condition, F < 1.5. 
A further analysis showed that performance improved from block pair 6 (Tasks: 731 
ms, 5.98%, CSR: 822 ms, 7.62%) to 7 (Tasks: 688 ms, 5.89% CSR: 738 ms, 5.52%) 
significantly in both the RTs, F(1,46) = 22.6, p < .001, = 0.0393, and the errors, F(1,46) = 
10.7, p < .01, = 0.0128. This decrease was larger in the CSR group than the Task group in 
the RT data, F(1,46) = 4.14, p < .05, = 0.00753. 
Discussion 
In the Tasks condition, as is standard in task-switching experiments, we instructed the 
participants to construe the cue as indicating the appropriate categorical task-rule to apply 
(odd-even or high-low). In the CSR condition, the only difference was that we augmented the 
standard instructions with a strong hint to try to learn stimulus-specific S-R and CSR 
mappings. The hint was effective in changing performance, though it did not improve it. The 
Tasks group showed the typical large switch cost, a modest response congruence effect, and 
the reduction in switch cost (and congruence effect) with preparation expected under these 
conditions. In contrast, the CSR group showed a smaller switch cost, no reduction in switch 
cost with preparation, and a larger congruence effect, consistent with the predictions of a 
simple associative account. The initial performance of the CSR group was poorer, perhaps 
because they were simultaneously grappling with task-level and stimulus-level mappings, but 
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they had largely caught up by the fifth block pair. It looks as if the CSR participants rapidly 
mastered and used the simple S-R mappings for congruent stimuli, as performance on them 
was fast and asymptotic after three block pairs, and showed no switch costs after just one 
block pair. Performance on the incongruent stimuli showed much more gradual improvement 
with practice, and continued to show a switch cost.  This is consistent with CSR learning.   
The transfer test, in which the stimuli were changed, also suggests that the CSR group 
were more reliant on associative retrieval by the end of training. The Tasks group show only 
a modest perturbation of performance on the transfer blocks pair, while the CSR group show 
a greater and more persistent impairment in performance, with switch costs reappearing for 
the congruent stimuli, and increasing substantially for the incongruent stimuli, though not all 
these trends were reliable.   
We draw two preliminary conclusions. First, it appears that associative learning of S-
R and CSR associations can come to mediate performance in a task-cuing paradigm with a 
small set of cues and stimuli presented many times, and is a reasonably effective strategy. We 
do not claim that the CSR group were reliant only on this associative strategy: we had, after 
all, instructed them in a task-set level strategy as well, and the mere addition of a hint to use 
an associative learning strategy is a relatively weak manipulation. Participants may well have 
varied considerably in the mixture of strategies they were using. Hence in Experiments 2 and 
3 we used training and instruction regimes designed to produce a better segregation of the 
task-based and association-based strategies.   
The hint to learn associations changed the pattern of performance qualitatively, 
reducing switch costs (especially for congruent stimuli), increasing the congruence effect, and 
abolishing the reduction in switch cost with preparation. Hence our second conclusion is that 
it is unlikely that participants in our Tasks group, and by extension other task-cuing 
experiments, were merely retrieving the response associated with each cue + stimulus 
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combination, contrary to the proposal of Logan and Bundesen (2003). Rather they were using 
the cue to select a categorical task-rule, and then applying it to the stimulus. Providing time 
for preparation allows the rule to be selected and readied for application in advance of the 
stimulus. This provides an additional answer to Dreisbach and Haider’s (2008) question of 
what benefit a task-set level rule provides when there are lower-level associations available: 
the task-set strategy affords effective preparation, a reduction of the otherwise complex 
mapping of stimuli to responses to a simpler one. And even when participants have no time to 
prepare before the stimulus, the hierarchical, two-step, strategy — select categorical rule, 
select appropriate S-R mapping — appears effective and natural. 
However, because we are likely seeing a mixture of strategies in the CSR group, this 
experiment merely suggests features of the data diagnostic of associative versus task-set 
responding. We cannot rule out, for example, the possibility that the CSR group learned and 
used only S-R, and none of the CSR, associations — i.e. their performance on the 
incongruent stimuli may still have been based largely on application of categorical task rules.  
The fact that the switch cost in the CSR condition was as large for the incongruent trials in 
the CSR group (75 ms) as the overall switch cost seen in the Tasks group (75 ms) would be in 
line with this hypothesis. A stronger manipulation of strategy is needed. 
Experiment 2 
In Experiment 2, the instructions to the CSR group contained no mention of two cue-
contingent categorisation task-rules. Participants were simply provided with a piece of paper 
listing the CSR mappings (in the same form as the right half of Figure 1) and asked to learn 
them, using block pair 1 as practice. Unlike Experiment 1 there was no practice nor any 
exposure to all the digits before block pair 1. This also meant that when participants were 
transferred from one set of stimuli to the other in block pair 6 they had not previously 
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responded to the new digits at all. The Tasks group received exactly the same blocks of trials 
as the CSR group, but with standard task-cuing instructions prior to block pair 1. 
Participants shown a list of stimulus-specific rules may nevertheless work out that 
categorical odd/even and low/high rules contingent on the cue can be used. Participants given 
task-cuing instructions may nevertheless adopt a CSR strategy. We therefore debriefed 
participants on what they thought they were doing, and replaced participants in each group 
until we had two groups of 16 whose introspections matched the instructions in force for their 
group. An analysis of the performance of the replaced participants will be discussed after 
Experiment 3. 
Method 
Participants   
The participants were 44 psychology undergraduates (Age range 18-35; average age 
20.4 years, 7 male) at the University of Exeter. Participants took part for course credit and a 
bonus payment contingent on their performance (average payment £2.11, range £1.75-£3.00).  
Apparatus and stimuli   
The experiment was programmed in Matlab (2008b) with Psychtoolbox installed, and 
run on an iMac computer.  The participants were seated 50 cm from the 20″ screen and tested 
individually. Cues were colored squares or diamonds of side 200 pixels (~6.1° of visual 
angle).   The blue shapes had RGB values of (115, 194, 251) whilst the pink shapes had RGB 
values of (255, 192, 203).  The set of stimulus digits used in the initial 10 block pairs was 
1,4,7,8 for half the participants, 2,3,6,9 for the other half; in the transfer blocks the other set 
was used.  Each stimulus digit was displayed in the centre of the cue in Courier bold font size 
60 (~1.3° tall).   
Design and Procedure    
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The design and randomization of the main part of the experiment were almost 
identical to those of Experiment 1, with the minor difference that which four digits were 
congruent and which were incongruent was counterbalanced by swapping the response 
mappings for the high/low task for half the participants. The procedure differed from 
Experiment 1 only in the following respects.  First, the single-task practice and switching 
practice blocks of Experiment 1 were deleted; what was described to the participant as 
“practice” was now effectively block pair 1 of Experiment 1.  Second, participants in the CSR 
condition were at the outset given the CSR combinations as a list (as on the right side of 
Figure 1) and told to learn these mappings for the individual stimuli; they were told nothing 
about tasks. Participants in the Tasks group were given standard task-set instructions and 
provided with an instruction sheet in the form of a flow chart (as on the left side of Figure 1).  
Third, as the participants in the present experiment were, unlike those in Experiment 1, 
participating for credit, we added small bonus payments for good performance:  at the end of 
each block after the first pair of blocks, a score was calculated by adding 5 for each error to 
the mean RT in centiseconds for that block; participants were asked to try and undercut their 
previous score with that CSI to earn a bonus point worth 25p.  Fourth, at the end of block pair 
5, participants were given a piece of paper outlining, in the condition-appropriate fashion, the 
correct responses for the transfer stimuli.  Participants kept this piece of paper for block pair 6 
before returning it to the experimenter and then completing the final block pair.  Finally, 
participants completed a post experiment questionnaire, asking them how they approached 
the experiment, and in particular whether, in the case of the Tasks group, they had used the 
specific categorical task rules given them (in which case they were included) and whether, in 
the case of the CSR group, they had induced such categorical task rules at any point in the 
experiment (in which case they were excluded).  
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Eight Tasks group participants were replaced because when asked “did you use the 
tasks to help you?”; they said they did not, leaving 16 who said they did.  Four CSR group 
participants were replaced because they mentioned using at least one categorical task rule, 
leaving 16 who did not.  The excluded participants will be discussed after Experiment 3. 
--- Insert Figure 4 about here --- 
Results 
In Experiment 2, block pair 1 reflects the initial encounter with these conditions, and 
block pair 6 now represents the first encounter with the transfer stimuli.  So the analysis 
strategy was similar to that in Experiment 1, except that the initial block pair was excluded.  
Both groups showed substantial improvement over the first 5 block pairs, with a marked 
improvement from the first to the second block pair. As Figure 4 shows, as in Experiment 1, 
performance was notably worse to start with in the CSR group, who had a relatively large 
number of stimulus-specific mappings to learn, than in the Tasks group, who had only the 
two sets of classification rules to learn. By the fifth block pair, the difference was less 
marked, with the CSR group having a median correct RT of 740 ms (3.57% errors), and the 
Tasks group 639 ms (4.76% errors). The critical contrasts summarised in Figure 5 show that, 
as in Experiment 1, the Tasks group showed a larger switch cost than the CSR group, a RISC 
effect when the CSR group showed none, and a smaller congruence effect than the CSR 
group.  Figure 4 shows that, as in Experiment 1, the CSR group's performance was much 
more impaired by transfer to a new set of stimuli in block pair 6, and the perturbation appears 
more persistent for that group. 
Block Pairs 2-5. 
Overall the CSR group were slower (795 ms) and made more errors (5.44%) than the 
Tasks group (681 ms, 4.78%). This was a significant difference for RTs, F(1,30) = 4.32, p < 
.05, = 0.0682, but not for the errors, F < 1.   
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Task switches and instruction.  As Figure 5 shows, the Tasks group had a much larger 
RT switch cost (139 ms) than the CSR group (29 ms), F(1,30) = 9.19, p < .001, = 0.0168, a 
difference of 110 ± 18.2 ms  The switch cost in the Tasks condition was highly reliable, 
F(1,15) = 17.6, p < .001, = 0.117, but the effect in the CSR group only marginally reliable, 
F(1,15) = 3.39, p = 0.086, = 0.00372. The error switch cost was also larger for the Tasks 
(1.95 ± 0.42%) than the CSR group (0.15 ± 0.56%), but this difference (1.8 ± 0.50%) was 
only marginally reliable, F(1,30) = 3.28, p = 0.080, = 0.00378; there was a significant 
switch cost in the Tasks group, F(1,15) = 10.6, p < .01, = 0.0188, but not in the CSR 
group, F<1. 
--- Insert Figure 5 about here --- 
Preparation and instruction. As Figure 5 shows, preparation reduced the switch cost 
in the Tasks group from 184 ms in the short-CSI blocks to 94 ms in the long-CSI blocks, a 
reliable RISC effect of 90 ± 17.6 ms, F(1,15) = 6.42, p < .05, = 0.0136. The equivalent 
effect in the CSR group was much smaller and not significant: the switch cost was 40 ms in 
the short-CSI blocks and 17 ms in the long-CSI blocks, a difference of 23 ± 8.41 ms, 
F(1,15)= 1.91, p = 0.187, = 0.000634.. However the three-way interaction was only 
marginally reliable, F(1,30) = 2.86, p = 0.1, = 0.000152. For the error rates, a similar 
pattern was present: for the Tasks group there was a larger switch cost in the short-CSI blocks 
(3.1%) than the long-CSI blocks  (0.8%), a reduction of 2.3 ± 0.58%, F(1,15) = 4.05, p = 
0.063, = 0.00661. For the CSR group the cost was 0.57% for the short-CSI blocks, and -
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0.26% for the long-CSI, a difference of .83 ± 0.49%, F < 1. The 3-way interaction was not 
reliable, F < 1.  
Participants in the Tasks condition also showed a overall preparation effect when just the 
repeat trials were considered, such that they were faster in a long-CSI (531 ms) than a short-
CSI (692 ms), F(1,15) =59.0, p < .001, = 0.184. However, they also made more errors at 
the long-CSI (4.41%) than the short (3.19%) but this was not reliable, F(1,15) = 1.52, p = 
0.237, = 0.00423. The CSR participants were also less accurate but only slightly faster at 
the long-CSI (775 ms, 5.67%) than at the short (787 ms, 5.06%). The interaction was not 
reliable, F < 1. 
Congruence and instruction. RT and error rates showed a much larger effect of 
congruence (incongruent minus congruent) in the CSR group (299 ms, 6.68%) than in the 
Tasks group (58 ms, 6.54%); the difference (241 ± 26.0 ms, 0.14 ± 0.90%) was highly 
reliable for RTs F(1,30) = 21.5, p < .001, = 0.0749, but not error rates, F < 1.  In separate 
analyses of the two groups, the congruence effect was reliable for both the Tasks group, RT: 
F(1, 15) =12.6, p < .001, = 0.0223, errors: F(1,15) = 26.3, p < .001, = 0.176 and for the 
CSR group: RT: F(1,15) = 36.6, p < .001, = 0.294 errors: F(1,15) = 28.3, p < .001, = 
0.164. 
Acquisition. As may be seen in Figure 4, overall performance evidently improved 
from block pair 2 to 5, and this was reliable for RTs, F(3,90) = 26.2, p < .001, = 0.0495 
and the errors, F(3,90) = 10.5, p < .001, = 0.0389. But the overall improvement in 
performance was not reliably different between the two groups. 
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The effects of task switch and the RISC effect were relatively stable across block 
pairs. However, the congruence effect in the CSR group changed across block pairs (as with 
Experiment 1), as indicated by the interaction between block pair, congruence and 
instructions in the RTs, F(3,90) = 4.91, p < .01, = 0.00483, but not in the errors; see Figure 
4. In separate analyses of the two groups there was a reliable interaction in the CSR group, 
RT: F(3,45) = 5.11, p < .05, = 0.0130; errors: F(3,45) = 5.42, p < .01, = 0.0348, but not 
in the Tasks condition, F < 1 in both the RTs and errors. In the CSR group this reflects the 
fact that performance on the congruent stimuli was essentially asymptotic after about three 
block pairs, while performance on the incongruent stimuli continued to improve. 
The effect of having time to prepare also differed across blocks and between the 
instructional groups in the errors, as indicated by the three-way interaction between CSI, 
block pair and instruction, F(3,90) = 2.76, p < .05, = 0.00683. Separate analyses showed 
this was a marginally significant interaction in the Tasks group, F(3,45) = 2.59, p = 0.064, 
= 0.0121, but not significant in the CSR group. The near significant interaction in the 
Tasks group was caused by participants initially (in block pair 2) making more errors with a 
short CSI (7.12%) than a long CSI (5.65%) but then by block pair 4 they were making more 
errors with a long CSI (6.11%) than a short CSI (3.42%).   
Other significant interactions. The present results revealed a slightly larger switch 
cost for incongruent (Tasks: 147 ms, CSR: 33 ms) than congruent trials (Tasks: 130 ms, CSR: 
23 ms), but the interaction was not reliable, and the error data did not show the same trend.  
There was a difference in error rate between the two instructional conditions, F(1,30) = 16.1, 
p<0.001, = 0.00943.  Separate analyses revealed a significant interaction between switch 
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and congruence in the Tasks group, F(1,15) = 10.8, p < .01, = 0.0190, and in the CSR 
group, F(1,15) = 5.36,  p< .05, = 0.00342.  In the Tasks group there were larger error 
switch costs for incongruent (3.92%) than for congruent trials (-0.01%), but in the CSR group 
there was a larger switch cost for congruent (1.03%) than for incongruent trials (-0.73%).  
The interaction between CSI and congruence (significant in Experiment1), was not significant 
in Experiment 2, F < 2, for either RTs or errors. 
The transfer test. 
As in Experiment 1 the effect of changing the stimuli was analyzed by comparing 
performance in block pair 5 with that in block pair 6, using a mixed ANOVA with the 
following factors: task switch (repeat or switch), congruence, CSI, block pair (5 or 6) and 
instruction condition. As expected, the CSR group was more affected by the transfer to new 
stimuli; their mean RT (error rate) increased by 177 ± 51  ms (1.97 ± 0.88%) as compared to 
the Tasks group’s (48 ± 8.5 ms, -0.94 ± 0.60 %).  However, the interaction was only 
marginally reliable for both RTs, F(1,30) = 3.15, p = 0.086, = 0.0158, and the error rate, 
F(1,30) = 3.72, p = 0.063, = 0.0104.  
Transfer to new stimuli increased the size of the congruence effect in the CSR group 
(26 ± 26.9 ms, 4.78 ± 0.89 %) but not in the Tasks group (4 ms ± 10.9, -1.48 ± 0.83 %).  This 
was supported by a significant interaction in the errors, F(1,30) = 6.57, p < .05, = 0.0120, 
but not in the RTs, F < 1.  Separate analyses of the errors revealed a significant interaction 
between block pair and congruence only in the CSR group, F(1,15) = 11.1, p < .05, = 
0.132.   
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Under both conditions, transfer to new stimuli changed the nature of the relationship 
between CSI and switching. In the errors, participants went from having a larger switch cost 
at a short (Tasks: 2.2%, CSR: 1.89%) compared to a long-CSI (Tasks: 0.87%, CSR: -0.71%), 
to having a larger switch cost at a long-CSI (Tasks: 0.95% CSR: 2.41%) rather than a short-
CSI (Tasks:  -0.64%, CSR: 0.63%). There was a significant block pair by CSI by task switch 
interaction in the errors F(1,30) = 4.99, p < .05, = 0.00411. This was not the case in the 
RTs, F(1,30) = 1.83, p = 0.186, = 0.000522, although participants under both conditions 
did show a larger difference between the size of the switch cost in a long and short CSI before 
transfer (Tasks: 135 ms, CSR: 42 ms) than after transfer (Tasks: 78 ms, CSR: 4 ms). 
A further analysis showed that performance improved from block pair 6 (Tasks: 687 
ms, 3.83%, CSR: 917 ms, 5.54%) to 7 (Tasks: 626 ms, 4.20% CSR: 765 ms, 3.70%) 
significantly in the RTs, F(1,30)=18.4, p<0.001, = 0.0409, but not in the errors, 
F(1,46)=1.16, p = 0.291, = 0.00256. The improvement was greater for the CSR group, 
especially for incongruent stimuli, but the corresponding interactions were not reliable; there 
was a considerable variability over participants within groups in how they coped with the 
transfer test. 
Discussion 
The results of Experiment 2 show that participants in a task-cuing paradigm under 
instructions to perform the task using specified CSR rules (and with no mention of the 
possibility of using a task-set strategy) produce a pattern of results quite different from 
participants given standard task-switching instructions.  As in Experiment 1, the CSR group 
showed large congruence effects, small switch costs and no reduction in switch cost with 
preparation, while the Tasks group showed relatively small congruence effects and large 
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switch costs which reduced with preparation.   The participants in the CSR condition again 
rapidly mastered the congruent relative to the incongruent stimuli, while in the Tasks group 
performance on congruent and incongruent stimuli improved at about the same rate. Transfer 
to a new set of stimuli was notably harder for the CSR then for the Tasks group. The 
consistent pattern across both experiments encourages us to believe that it reflects genuine 
processing differences contingent on the participant's approach to the task rather than mere 
artifacts of procedure.  These effects will be discussed further in the General Discussion. 
The interaction between switch and congruence in the CSR errors seems inconsistent 
with Experiment 1.  However, the RTs show a non-significant effect in the opposite direction, 
so we do not dwell on this.  The lack of a CSI by congruence interaction in this experiment is 
another point of disagreement between the first two experiments.  However, as Monsell and 
Mizon (2006) and Kiesel et al (2010) note, this interaction has an inconsistent history in the 
literature.   
The transfer test was somewhat unsatisfactory in this experiment, because the new 
stimuli in block pair 6 were accompanied by an instruction sheet giving the new CSR 
mappings for the CSR group, and the task rules applied to the new stimuli for the Tasks 
group.   Thus, although the CSR group showed a greater perturbation in performance, this 
may be neither surprising nor informative, as the CSR group had much more need to refer to 
the instruction sheet, and this is likely to have disrupted performance.  Moreover, although 
large, the difference between groups was unreliable for RTs and only marginally reliable for 
error rates, possibly reflecting large individual differences in the need to refer to the 
instruction sheet. This issue is addressed in Experiment 3, in which we adopted a procedure 
perhaps more suited to the idea of associative learning: we taught the CSR mappings to the 
CSR group by means of trial and error alone.  
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Another objection that could be raised against both experiments so far is that the set of 
task cues used do not truly constitute two distinct cues per task. Though the cue changed on 
all trials, the dimension that changed on repeat trials was essentially irrelevant to the 
response, and participants could have learned to ignore that dimension. Hence it is possible 
that the small switch cost seen in the CSR condition was caused by the cue changes being 
more salient on switch trials, so that the apparent switch cost is an effect of cue change. 
Experiment 3 addressed this issue by using 4 shape cues (a circle, triangle, square and 
pentagon), with two arbitrarily assigned to each task, and a trial sequence such that the cue 
changed on every trial.  
Another issue concerns the way in which knowledge is acquired.  In the CSR groups 
of Experiments 1 and 2 participants either knew the task-sets (Experiment 1) or were 
explicitly told the correct responses for a given cue and stimulus pair (Experiment 2), so that 
any associative learning that occurred was probably (initially) supported by another 
(declarative) representation of the contingencies. In Experiment 3, we removed these props 
and, while presenting the same sequences of trials, required participants to learn the responses 
simply by trial and error, as perhaps the most straightforward “invitation” to the system to use 
basic associative learning to solve the problem. 
Experiment 3 
There were two differences between this and Experiment 2. First, no instructions at all 
were given to the CSR group, except that they had to learn by trial and error the correct 
response to each combination of cue and stimulus.  Second, two distinct shape cues were used 
for each task.    
Method 
Participants  
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The participants were 46 psychology undergraduates (average age: 19.0 years, 6 male) 
at the University of Exeter, They took part for course credit and a bonus payment contingent 
on their performance (average payment £2.03, range £1.50-£2.50).  
Stimuli   
The task cues were a regular circle, triangle, square and pentagon with a standardized 
area of 40,000 pixels, filled with blue (RGB: 115, 194, 251); the digit stimulus was displayed 
in the centre of the cue in size 60 Courier bold font as before. The two sets of digits used 
were again 1,4,7,8 and 2,3,6,9. The computer and screen were as in Experiment 2. 
Design and procedure  
The design and randomization of the trial sequences was as in Experiment 2 except 
that there were now four distinct shape cues, with two shapes signaling one task and two the 
other. Thus, the cue changed on every trial, but only some changes signaled a change of task. 
Participants in the Tasks condition were given standard task-set instructions verbally, 
whereas participants in the CSR condition were directed to learn cue-stimulus  response 
connections on the basis of trial-by-trial feedback. Both groups were told the first two blocks 
were for practice. As in the previous two experiments, after 5 block pairs the set of stimuli 
used was swapped to the other possible set of stimuli, and again participants were told they 
could treat the first two block pairs after the change as practice.  
Participants were debriefed as in Experiment 2, and replaced if their reported strategy 
differed from that instructed. Six participants in the Tasks group who did not mention using 
the tasks in the questionnaire, and 7 participants in the CSR group who induced one (5 
participants) or both (2 participants) of the tasks, were replaced, until there were 16 
participants per group whose reports matched the instructions. The replaced participants will 
be discussed later.  
Results 
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--- Insert Figure 6 and 7 about here --- 
Performance is shown as a function of block pair in Figure 6, and critical contrasts are 
summarized in Figure 7. The main results are similar to those in the previous experiments. A 
small but reliable switch cost in the CSR group, but a larger one in the Tasks group: a much 
larger congruence effect in the CSR than the Tasks group; a large RISC effect in the Tasks 
group, none in the CSR group; transfer to new stimuli much more disruptive in the CSR 
group. 
Block Pairs 2-5 
As the CSR group now had to learn 16 distinct CSR mappings from error-correction 
alone, it is not surprising that they did not reach a level of performance equivalent to the 
Tasks group by block pair 5. On average their median RT in block pair 5 was longer (735 ms) 
than the Tasks group (651 ms) and they made more errors (5.02%) than the Tasks group 
(3.09%); the difference stems largely from performance on incongruent stimuli.  
As for Experiment 2, a mixed ANOVA with the factors: task switch (repeat, switch), 
congruence (congruent, incongruent), CSI (long or short), block pair (2,3,4 or 5) and 
instruction condition (Tasks, CSR) was run on median correct reaction time (RT) and percent 
errors, and followed up by separate ANOVAs for the two groups where appropriate. Overall 
the CSR group were slower (777 ± 106.2 ms) and made more errors (11.9 ± 6.4 %) than the 
Tasks group (700 ± 94.6 ms, 4.62 ± 2.97%). This was a significant difference for errors, 
F(1,30) = 25.6, p < .001,  = 0.118, but not RTs, F(1,30) = 2.47, p = 0.13, = 0.036. 
---- Insert Figure 7 about here --- 
Task switches and instruction.  As with Experiments 1 and 2 there was a larger switch 
cost in the Tasks group (73 ± 13.4 ms) than in the CSR group (30 ± 8.8 ms), F(1,30) = 3.83, p 
< .06, = 0.00307 (see Figure 7). The costs were reliable for both the Tasks condition, 
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F(1,15) = 15.1, p < .001, = 0.0452 and the CSR condition, F(1,15) = 5.58, p < .05, = 
0.00420. For errors, the overall main effect of a task switch was reliable, F(1,30) = 6.58, p < 
.05, = 0.00597 (repeat: 7.98%, switch: 9.05%), but there was no reliable interaction with 
instruction, F(1,30) = 1.31, p = 0.26, = 0.00119: the switch cost was 0.86 ± 0.49 % for the 
Tasks group and 2.24 ± 0.70 % for the CSR group  
Preparation and instruction. As Figure 7 shows, preparation reduced the RT switch 
cost in the Tasks group by 50 ± 10.5 ms,  from 99 ms in the short-CSI blocks to 49 ms in the 
long-CSI blocks, F(1,15) = 5.84, p< .05, = 0.00559.  There was no such effect in the CSR 
group, for whom the switch cost was 27 ms in the short-CSI blocks and 32 ms in the long-
CSI blocks, an increase of 5 ± 11.3  ms,  F < 1. The interaction was marginally reliable 
F(1,30) = 3.27, p = 0.084, = 0.00122. Participants in the Tasks condition also showed a 
general preparation effect, whereby if only the task-repeat trials are considered they were 
faster with a long-CSI (527 ms) than with a short-CSI (849 ms), F(1,15) = 155, p < .001, = 
0.481.  For the same contrast the CSR group was also faster with the long- CSI (745 ms) than 
at the short-CSI (845 ms), F(1,15) = 16.9, p < .001, = 0.0344, but the effect was 
considerably smaller.  The three-way interaction was significant, F(1,30) = 64.0, p < .001, 
= 0.107. These interactions were not significant in the errors (F < 1).  
Congruence and instruction. RT and error rates showed (Figure 6) a much larger 
effect of congruence in the CSR group (308 ± 31.4 ms, 17.1 ± 1.96%) than in the Tasks group 
(60  ± 12.1 ms, 4.26 ± 0.83%); the interaction was highly reliable both for RTs, F(1,30) = 
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27.3, p < .001, = 0.0881 and in the error rates, F(1,30) = 18.2, p < .001, = 0.0934. In 
separate analyses, the congruence effect was reliable for both the Tasks group, F(1, 15) = 
12.5, p < .001, = 0.0306, for RTs,  and F(1,15) = 13.3, p < .01, = 0.0802, for errors, and  
the CSR group, F(1,15) = 48.4, p < .001, = 0.318, for RT, and F(1,15) = 37.9, p < .001, 
= 0.331, for errors. 
Acquisition effects. Overall performance improved from block pair 2 to 5 (Figure 7), 
and this was reliable for RTs, F(3,90) = 8.99, p < .001, = 0.0287. Participants in the CSR 
group learning by trial and error alone had a much higher initial error rate than in Experiment 
2, and a steeper learning curve than the Tasks condition, as indicated by a significant 
interaction between block pair and instructions, F(1,30) = 16.7, p < .001, = 0.00545. 
Again the Tasks group showed little change in congruence and switch effects over 
blocks, while the CSR group showed markedly different learning rates for congruent and 
incongruent stimuli, with near-asymptotic performance reached for congruent stimuli by 
about block pair 4, while the incongruent stimuli show continuous and substantial 
improvement over the whole range. This time, presumably because trial and error learning is 
harder, the improvement was manifest largely in errors, so that the three-way interaction 
between block pair, congruence and instructions was significant in the errors only, F(3,90) = 
10.0, p < .001, = 0.0344. Separate analyses revealed a highly significant block pair by 
congruence interaction in the CSR condition, F(3,45) = 18.5, p < .001, = 0.104, but not in 
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the Tasks group, F(3,45) = 2.34, p = 0.09, = 0.0110. Figure 6 shows that in the CSR 
condition performance on the incongruent trials did not approach asymptote. 
Other significant interactions. In agreement with Experiment 1 the switch cost was 
again larger for incongruent trials for the CSR group (39 ms, 3.85%) than congruent trials (19 
ms, 0.63%). For the Tasks group the error switch cost was larger for incongruent trials 
(1.82%) than for congruent:(-0.14%) but the RT error cost was smaller for incongruent (63 
ms) than for the congruent trials (85 ms). Overall there was a significant interaction between 
task switch and congruence in the errors, F(1,30) = 7.02, p < .05, = 0.00422, but not in the 
RTs. However, this interaction did not differ reliably between the two experimental 
conditions in the errors or RTs. The congruence effect was larger in the short (Tasks: 82 ms, 
CSR: 342 ms) than the long-CSI (Tasks: 39 ms, CSR: 276 ms), F(1,30)= 9.79, p<0.01, 
though the proportional reduction was much larger for the Tasks condition.  The three-way 
interaction with instruction was not significant for either RT or errors, F<1.  
The transfer test 
As can be seen in Figure 6, the perturbation of performance by the introduction of 
novel stimuli at block pair 6 was more marked and persistent for the CSR group, especially 
for incongruent stimuli. The effect of transfer was analyzed as for Experiments 1 and 2, 
although it is worth noting that in this experiment participants were told to treat block pair 6 
as practice. As expected, the CSR group was more affected by the transfer to new stimuli; 
their RT (error rate) increased by 106 ± 35.7 ms (9.18 ± 1.43%) as compared to the Tasks 
group’s 64 ± 13.9 ms (2.18 ± 0.56%). The interaction was significant for the error rate, 
F(1,30) = 10.5, p < .01 = 0.0377, but not the RTs, F(1,30) < 1. 
Performance improved from block pair 6 (Tasks: 715 ms, 5.28%, CSR: 841 ms, 
14.2%) to 7 (Tasks: 632 ms, 4.07% CSR: 756 ms, 5.33%) significantly both in the RTs, 
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F(1,30) = 24.5, p < .001, = 0.0349, and in the errors, F(1,46) = 33.4, p < .001, = 0.0669. 
The CSR group reduced their error rate significantly more than participants in the Tasks 
group, F(1,30) = 19.4, p < .001, = 0.0399— but had much more room for improvement. 
Discussion 
The CSR group, who learnt only by trial and error, showed a similar pattern of results to the 
CSR groups in the previous experiments, i.e. much larger congruence effects and smaller 
switch costs than the Tasks group. Preparation reliably reduced the switch cost in the Tasks 
group but not in the CSR group (though the interaction was only marginally reliable). In the 
CSR group, the learning curves for congruent stimuli reached asymptote while the learning 
curve for the incongruent stimuli did not, indicating that the correct responses were easier to 
learn for the congruent stimuli. The consistency of these differences across experiments 
suggests that they are not greatly dependent on the procedure used to induce CSR learning, or 
procedural details such as the type of cue.   
However, it is clear that in this experiment, compared to the first two, the CSR group 
were at a much greater disadvantage relative to the Tasks group, both when they started the 
experiment, and at transfer. They had no way of knowing which response to make to a given 
cue-stimulus combination until they had encountered that combination and been given 
feedback at least once, and then they had to remember the mapping. This doubtless explains 
the CSR group’s higher error rates, both in block pairs 2 to 5 and the transfer block (and 
hence the smaller impact of transfer in the CSR condition in this experiment compared to the 
previous two: they were starting from a higher baseline).  
General Discussion 
In three experiments with the trial sequences and response contingencies of a task-
cuing experiment, with small sets of four stimuli and four task cues, we have shown that quite 
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different patterns of performance are obtained when participants follow standard task-cuing 
instructions to apply one of two classification rules as specified by the cue, compared to when 
they are induced to learn and use cue + stimulus  response (CSR) mappings. In all three 
experiments, the task-instructed group showed the usual pattern of a large task-switch cost, a 
reduction in that switch cost when time was allowed for preparation, and modest congruence 
effects that changed little with practice after the first block pair. When transferred to a new 
set of stimuli, they also showed only modest perturbation of performance, similar for all 
combinations of congruence and switch/repeat, consistent with a transient adjustment as the 
existing rules were applied to new stimuli.  
The three experiments induced CSR learning in the other group of participants in 
different ways. In Experiment 1, we merely supplemented standard task instructions with 
encouragement to learn CSR mappings. In Experiment 2, the CSR group was given a list of 
the CSR mappings to learn with no mention of tasks. In Experiment 3, the CSR group learnt 
the mappings by trial and error alone, again with no mention of tasks. In each case the CSR 
group exhibited a large congruence effect, and a small but reliable "switch cost" (as defined 
for the Tasks group), which was not significantly or consistently reduced by preparation. The 
CSR group also showed more rapid improvement on the congruent stimuli (which require the 
learning only of simple S-R associations) than on the incongruent stimuli (which require 
learning of conditional associations), and suffered a considerable decline in performance 
when transferred to a new set of stimuli, especially for incongruent stimuli.  The less efficient 
transfer in the CSR groups highlights one of the key advantages of using a task-set strategy in 
this paradigm: its ability to deal with novel stimuli.  
It is worth commenting on the difference between the results obtained in our transfer 
test and in Dreisbach, Goshke & Haider (2006)’s Experiment 1. Our CSR participants who 
were unaware of the task rules showed worse performance in a transfer test than the Tasks 
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participants. In contrast Dreisbach, Goshke & Haider's (2006) participants showed worse 
performance in a transfer test in their Tasks condition than in their SR condition.  The most 
obvious difference is that Dreisbach et al’s stimuli were univalent, so their participants had to 
re-learn only SR rules, and may well have succeeded in doing so well within the ten 
presentations per stimulus in their transfer blocks.  In our experiments the conflict created by 
bivalent incongruent stimuli evidently prompted more extended relearning than could be 
accomplished in the first few exposures. 
The "replaced" participants. 
It is of interested to consider the participants we replaced because their introspective 
reports of their strategies did not match the strategies we intended to induce. In Experiments 2 
and 3, in the CSR condition 11 out of 43 participants reported having discovered and used a 
task-set strategy at some point. That there were more such cases in Experiment 3 (7 versus 4) 
may be because participants in Experiment 2 were given a more prescriptive demonstration of 
how to approach the experiment — the instruction sheet provided.  
Perhaps of more importance for the interpretation of standard task-switching data is 
the finding that nearly a third of participants (14 out of 46) in the Tasks condition of 
Experiments 2 and 3 reported having learned and used at least some CSR mappings instead 
of, or as well as, task-based classification rules. We describe some of their introspections 
later. Effects of the critical variables for these participants resembled more those observed for 
the CSR than for Tasks group:  large congruence effects (219 ms for RT, 11.8% for errors), 
relatively modest “switch cost” (61 ms, 3.57%), and no RISC effect (short-CSI minus long-
CSI switch cost: -38.3 ms,  -0.66%).  In task-cuing experiments where CSR learning is 
relatively easy (e.g. one cue per task, small numbers of stimuli, half of the stimuli being 
congruent) the adoption of a CSR strategy by some participants could add unnecessary noise 
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to data. It would seem worthwhile to debrief participants carefully in such experiments. And 
the use of such small stimulus sets might best be avoided. 
The induction of task rules has recently been considered by Collins and Frank (2013).  
They suggest that people naturally induce tasks even in situations where using such a strategy 
is actually disadvantageous for performance, as in the case explored by Dreisbach and 
colleagues.  The experiments of Collins and Frank (2013) explore associative structures 
different from those examined here.  However, it is interesting to consider how our findings, 
that in a situation where neither strategy confers much benefit relative to the other (and if 
anything using task-sets affords a slight advantage), impacts on their conclusions about why 
participants induce and use task-sets.  They argue that task-sets allow easier generalizability, 
prevent conflict (cf. Dreisbach et al) and create a 2-stage decision-making process.  Here all 
these things are certainly true, yet some Tasks participants explicitly given task rules still 
opted not to use them and the majority of CSR participants did not induce task rules.  It may 
be worth considering what advantages using CSR mappings may have – perhaps they are 
easier to automatize and so require less cognitive effort to use.  
  
We now discuss (i) the implications of our results for accounts of performance in the 
task-cuing paradigm, (ii) an associative account of performance in the CSR condition, (iii) the 
implications for associative versus propositional accounts of learning. 
Implications for a compound-retrieval account.   
The first conclusion we draw is that our overall findings are problematic for the 
general class of theory which seeks to explain standard task-cuing performance in terms of 
memory retrieval; Logan et al's (2003) model is the notable explicit example.  According to 
such a theory, in a task-cuing experiment with standard instructions, participants do not 
switch between classification rule-sets through exercise of an "endogenous" control operation 
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triggered by interpretation of the cue's identity. They merely retrieve the response maximally 
activated by the combination of cue and stimulus, applying a single CSR task-set throughout. 
In the CSR conditions of our experiments we used a very small stimulus set to make the CSR 
contingencies easy to learn, and gave instructions and training designed to encourage a 
compound retrieval strategy.  The results indicate that participants can apply a CSR strategy 
successfully given a reasonable amount of practice, though it may initially be costly in errors. 
But, when they do apply this strategy, we see a pattern of performance quite different from 
that seen when participants are given standard task-set instructions.  It would appear to follow 
that participants who are given standard task-set instructions, and produce the patterns of data 
usually reported in the task-switching literature, cannot be using a CSR strategy, at least of 
the “episodic” kind, as defined by Arrington & Logan (2004). If they were already using a 
CSR strategy, telling them or training them to use it should not change the pattern of 
performance so dramatically. 
A hierarchical task-set strategy (select classification rule then select response) not 
only appears to be a natural way for participants to construe the demands of a task-cuing 
experiment, it also confers some notable advantages.  It obviates the need to learn a large set 
of stimulus-specific rules, it allows easy generalization to novel stimuli, it provides a basis for 
effective preparation when time and foreknowledge permit (the appropriate classification rule 
can be readied and perhaps the other suppressed), and (as suggested by Dreisbach & Haider, 
2008, 2009) it defends against interference from currently irrelevant S-R mappings — as 
indexed here by the modest congruence effect in the Tasks relative to the CSR condition. And 
the generalization to new stimuli accommodates the observation that when task-cuing 
experiments use larger stimulus sets (e.g. Monsell & Mizon, 2006), or very large stimulus 
sets, such that stimuli never (Arrington & Logan, 2004) or only rarely repeat (Elchlepp, 
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Lavric & Monsell, submitted; Monsell & Mizon, submitted) the phenomenology is 
qualitatively similar to that observed with small stimulus sets. 
We temper this argument against compound-retrieval as a general account of task-
cuing performance with two observations.  First, the results of the CSR condition clearly 
indicate that people can adopt and efficiently use a compound retrieval strategy under 
conditions where the stimulus set is small enough to permit effective stimulus-specific 
learning, where sufficient practice is given, and where effective preparation is not a 
requirement.  Second, experimenters using the task-cuing paradigm, especially with small 
stimulus sets (as is quite common), need to be alert to the possibility that some of their 
subjects may be learning and using CSR learning even when they are given standard task-set 
instructions; in this case performance (or brain activation) would not be fully representative 
of the selection and application of task-sets.   
To cope with large stimulus sets with few stimulus repetitions, or trial-unique stimuli 
with no stimulus repetitions, it is necessary for a compound-retrieval model to allow 
participants to retrieve the response to the combination not of specific stimulus and cue, but 
of the stimulus and a mediating representation of the relevant attribute as signaled by the cue  
(Arrington & Logan’s, 2004 “semantic” strategy): essentially the cue asks “is it odd or 
even?”, the stimulus “7” activates both “odd” and “low” and applying both these cues 
conjointly to memory maximally activates “odd” more than the other response alternatives. 
This account essentially posits activation by the cue of a representation of the classification 
task required (Schneider & Logan, 2007), but denies that there is a change in task-set when 
the task-representation changes: the constant task-set is simply to perform the compound 
retrieval operation. Is it possible that, in Arrington and Logan’s terms, our participants were 
applying the “semantic” compound retrieval strategy in the Tasks condition, but the 
“episodic” compound retrieval strategy in the CSR condition? 
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There would seem to be two kinds of argument against this. First, the rationale would 
presumably be that in the CSR condition, unlike the Tasks condition, the instructions do not 
assist the participants to identify the relevant categorical dimensions, and so they tend to use 
the episodic strategy and learn specific C-S compounds rather than the mediating task labels. 
But this rationale works only for Experiments 2 and 3.  In Experiment 1, CSR participants 
were given the same task-set instruction as the Tasks participants, but still – apparently – 
slugged away at learning specific CSR or at least SR associations in spite of the explicit 
availability to them of the semantic strategy.     
The second argument is more fundamental. Both the “semantic” version of compound 
retrieval and the TSR account invoke representations of the two classification tasks required.  
In the compound retrieval account, this is generated from the cue and then applied 
simultaneously with the encoded stimulus to activate responses from memory. In the TSR 
account it is applied to reconfigure task-set (e.g. bias attention towards the relevant attribute 
and/or activate/retrieve/select the relevant S-R rules) which is then applied to classify the 
stimulus.  The critical difference between the accounts is in the timing.  In the compound-
retrieval account, retrieval waits until both task and stimulus representations are ready. In the 
TSR model, the task-set is reconfigured and then the R corresponding to the S is retrieved. 
This two-stage two-level property of the TSR account supplies a natural account of the switch 
cost and its reduction with preparation (the RISC effect): the further ahead the participant can 
get with task-set preparation before stimulus onset, the better. Either version of the compound 
retrieval account (semantic or episodic) must rely on the priming of cue-encoding to explain 
the switch cost and RISC effect, with the facilitation on “task-repeat” trials having 
qualitatively if not quantitatively identical effects whether the immediately preceding cue is 
identical, associated, or retrieves the same mediating label (Schneider and Logan, 2005, 
2007). Hence if Tasks participants use the semantic compound-retrieval strategy, and CSR 
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participants the episodic compound-retrieval strategy, we should still see a reduction in 
switch cost with preparation in both conditions.  But we did not. Only the Tasks condition 
showed a RISC effect, consistent with task-set reconfiguration in that condition, and some 
other strategy in the CSR condition. 
An associative account of performance in the CSR condition. 
We now examine in more detail the claim that this “other” strategy reflects associative 
learning and retrieval.  Some features of the performance we observed in our experiments are 
intuitively explicable in these terms. There is a large congruence effect because of associative 
interference when one element of the cue + stimulus compound is a stimulus associated with 
both responses. The congruent stimuli are much easier to learn than the incongruent stimuli, 
as the former require learning of simple stimulus-response associations whereas the 
incongruent stimuli require learning of biconditional discriminations.  The lack of a 
preparation effect is unsurprising because the cue is equally associated with both responses, 
so there is nothing to prepare6.  Less intuitively obvious, however, is the finding of what 
appears to be a small “switch cost” even when there are no task-representations to switch 
between.   
---- Insert Figure 8 about here --- 
However it turns out that a small "switch cost" is generated by an associative learning 
network with no representation of the underlying tasks.  In order to demonstrate this we 
modeled the data using the most recent version of the APECS model, a three-layer back-
propagation localist connectionsist network — see Figure 8, McLaren, (2011) and  McLaren, 
Forrest & McLaren (2012) for more details of the model. The main differences between 
                                                
6 In fact some participants in the CSR condition in Experiments 2 and 3 said that that they 
examined the digit first and then looked to the cue for the digits with inconsistent responses. 
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APECS and a standard back-propagation network are that APECS has adaptive learning 
parameters which favor the unit best suited for carrying a given mapping, and adaptive biases 
to preserve this learning, and that it is trained to replicate the input on the output units as well 
as generate the right response.  This gives APECS a more discrete representation at the 
hidden layer than a standard back-propagation network.  The model is able to learn the 
correct responses for a given cue and stimulus pair based purely on modifying the weights on 
links between input units, hidden units, and output from feedback, with no control 
mechanism.  We ran a simulation with input units for each of the four cues and eight digits, 
two output units for the responses and an intermediate layer of 14 hidden units.  The network 
was trained on trial sequences generated in the same way as in the above experiments; 32 
networks initialized with random weights were run as pseudo-subjects. No attempt was made 
to capture the temporal dynamics of a trial (and hence compare short and long CSI 
conditions); on each trial the combination of cue and stimulus was applied to the network, it 
generated activation of the output units, and error-correction was applied to modify the 
connection weights using the APECS algorithm. 
As expected the performance of the model was worse on incongruent than congruent 
stimuli. This difference between incongruent and congruent trials evolved over blocks in a 
way similar to the results of Experiment 3, as the congruent trials were much easier for the 
model to learn. Critically, the model’s performance was also worse on “task-switch” than 
“task-repeat” trials (significantly so if we treat the 32 networks as “subjects”, F (1,31) = 4.46, 
p < 0.05, = 0.00630; switch trials 0.063, repeat trials 0.0567). This “switch cost” was 
                                                
7 The performance of the model was examined by comparing the activation difference 
between the two output units, which corresponded to the two responses, and the target 
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significantly larger for the incongruent  (0.0130) than the congruent trials (0.000599), F(1,31) 
= 4.16, p = 0.05, = 0.00525, and was reliable only for the incongruent stimuli, F(1,31) = 
4.99, p < 0.05, = 0.0123; not for the congruent stimuli, F < 1. Unsurprisingly performance 
also suffered when the stimuli were exchanged for a new set of four.  In other words the 
model showed a pattern of data broadly similar to the CSR groups in our experiments, 
suggesting that “dumb” low-level associative learning is a viable explanation for the pattern 
of behaviour seen in the CSR conditions.   
Why is there an advantage for “task-repeat” trials in the absence of a task-
representation? It is somewhat easier to intuit the basis of this advantage for the case where 
an incongruent stimulus is repeated on successive trials: on a "task-switch" trial, a different 
response has just been made to that stimulus and the wrong CSR association reinforced, 
whereas on a "task-repeat" trial the same response is required, and the appropriate CSR 
association has been reinforced on the previous trial. However, this does not account for all 
the switch cost seen in the CSR condition: when immediate stimulus repeats were excluded 
from the data from Experiment 3, there was still a persistent switch cost in the CSR condition, 
F(1,15) = 9.784, p = 0.007, = 0.00364 (repeat: 795 ms, switch: 824 ms). But the APECS 
simulations also deliver a small switch cost in these circumstances. When stimulus repeats 
were removed from the simulated data there was a significant switch cost for the simulation 
of Experiment 3, F(1,31) = 12.1, p < .05, = 0.00691 (repeat: 0.056, switch: 0.063).  
Moreover, the interaction between task switch and congruence was inconsistent across the 
                                                                                                                                                  
difference (target difference-trained difference).  On this measure larger scores mean worse 
performance. The same results were obtained if MSE was used as the dependent measure.  
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behavioural experiments.  The basis of these effects in both the experiments and the model is 
at present unclear, and further explorations are needed. We speculate that the internal (hidden 
unit) representations used by the network overlap for different CSR mappings (this is clearly 
true of our simulation) and that hence interference between trials can take place even when 
they do not share the same cue and stimulus. What is not clear is why this should favor task 
repeat trials over task switch trials. It may be that these internal representations do capture the 
"equivalence" of the two cues used to signal the same task and thus generate a small switch 
cost — an account similar to Logan and Schneider's (2005) proposal of priming of a 
mediating task representation. For now, the moral is that the "task-switch" cost in the CSR 
condition is compatible with an associative account in which there are no task representations 
as such.  
Are participants in the CSR condition learning associatively?  
So far we have entertained the possibility that the CSR participants learned to respond 
through low-level associative mechanisms.  An alternative possibility is that participants were 
learning and using CSR rules, but in no less a "cognitive" or "symbolic" way than the Tasks 
group construes the situation as one involving switches between two classification rules.  
Mitchell, De Houwer and Lovibond (2009), for example, have argued that there is no need to 
postulate an underlying automatic associative system at all; they claim that all learning takes 
place via the formation of propositional beliefs.  While leaving intact the implications of our 
findings for task-switching, such an account would be counter to the hope we expressed at the 
outset, that our experiments might contribute to extending the domain of application of the 
idea that a hybrid of symbolic (or propositional) processing with low-level associative 
processes underlies human cognition. 
On what basis might we distinguish propositional and associative accounts of the CSR 
group's performance? One argument for the associative account is that a relatively simple 
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connectionist learning model captures important aspects of performance, even aspects that are 
not obvious consequences of a propositional CSR strategy such as the “switch cost”.  Another 
argument could be drawn from Stoet and Snyder's (2003a, 2003b, 2007) rhesus monkeys, 
who, after massive practice, showed only small switch costs but a larger congruence effect 
than human controls who received standard task-set instructions and relatively little practice.  
Of course, if one is willing to grant monkeys the same sorts of propositional representation as 
humans, this observation has no force.  It may then be worth investigating how animals such 
as pigeons — often taken to be purely associative beings (Mackintosh, 1988) — would 
perform in these situations.  
One argument for a propositional account is that in their responses to our post-
experiment questionnaires in Experiments 2 and 3, participants in the CSR condition 
articulated propositional rules. They often noted that two of the numbers (the congruent 
stimuli) were each linked to only one response, e.g. "8 was always left".  They also outlined 
mappings for the incongruent stimuli, most often by describing one (or two) of them and then 
explaining how various changes meant the opposite response.  In these outlines, in 
Experiment 3, they would always refer to the two cues which went with each task as being 
equivalent, e.g. "square and circle with 7 means right but if it’s a triangle or pentagon it’s the 
opposite response and 4 was the opposite of 7".  Explicit use of such rules would evidently be 
easier for the congruent stimuli as their rules are simpler and easier to learn. No benefit for 
preparation would be expected, as a relevant rule could not be engaged until the stimulus was 
presented. The relatively rapid recovery from transfer to new stimuli in the CSR group (albeit 
slower than in the Tasks group) could be accounted for by the participant having discovered 
what rule structure is required to solve the problem. One test of a rule, by contrast with a 
simple association, is whether it can be generalized (Murphy, Mondragón & Murphy, 2008) 
— but in this case a simple associative model can also be shown to produce a degree of 
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generalization, as the same cues are used in the first part of the experiment and the transfer 
phase.  Hence in this case the transfer test is not discriminative between stimulus-specific 
rules and associations.  
Of course the ability to articulate a propositional rule does not mean that performance 
is being driven by it. It has long been thought that skill develops through proceduralization of 
what is initially represented declaratively (e.g. Anderson, 1982; Fitts, 1964). So, even if 
propositional rules can be articulated, performance in the CSR group may nevertheless be 
mediated, after practice, by an associative procedure.   
A related issue may be raised for the Tasks group.  Although their performance 
suggests use of a task-set strategy, they are exposed to the same opportunities for low-level 
associative CSR learning as the CSR group. Does the use of task-level classification rules 
block the automatic acquisition or expression of lower-level SR and CSR associations?  Or 
does true associative learning take longer to provide a sufficiently efficient "procedural" basis 
for performance than the single session of practice we have provided here? It may be noted 
that switch costs are relatively robust over multiple sessions (e.g. Rogers & Monsell, 1995). 
We are pursuing these questions with further experiments. 
For the present, we conclude that inducing a CSR strategy in the task-cuing paradigm 
leads to a pattern of performance quite different from that generated by use of the strategy of 
selectively activating a classification rule (or task-set) on the basis of the contextual cue, and 
atypical of the pattern usually seen in task-cuing experiments. Performance mediated by CSR 
learning is broadly consistent with an associative account.  But learning and retrieving 
responses to compounds of cue and stimulus appears, on the whole, neither a natural nor an 
effective strategy for the standard task-cuing situation, as it takes longer to learn, does not 
generalize easily to new stimuli, does not allow for effective preparation, and does not shield 
against irrelevant information.  
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Appendix  
Experiment 1 Instructions 
Participants in both conditions were initially given identical instructions explaining that the 
cue indicated the task, and specifying the response categories for each task. The only 
difference between the conditions was that the CSR group was shown the following advice 
after the practice blocks:   
TOP TIP! 
Only four digits will be used in the following blocks:  
<1, 7, 4 and 8>. 
Here’s a tip that may help you improve your performance. 
At the moment, on each trial, you have to work through something like:   
“oh, the background’s  <square> 
that’s odd/even,  
the digit’s a 2, that’s even,  
and so the response must be LEFT.” 
But, as you practice, you may find that you can gradually learn to respond on the basis of a 
small set of “rules” or “pairings”, including 
Square + 2 —> RIGHT 
Diamond + 2 —> LEFT 
With only 4 digits, there are not many such pairings. 
If you can learn them, you won’t need to worry so much about which classification you are 
supposed to be doing! 
 
Onscreen instructions for Experiment 2 and 3 
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The onscreen instructions were very similar for Experiments 2 and 3 except that in 
Experiment 2 participants were informed that they would be given a piece of paper reminding 
them about how to respond for the practice blocks and the cues varied between the 
experiments (blue/pink squares/diamonds in Experiment 2 and four different shapes in 
Experiment 3). 
In the task condition they were given the following onscreen instructions:  
“Welcome!  You should have the index fingers of your left and right hands resting on the 
marked "z" and "/" keys - we will call these the LEFT and RIGHT keys.  On each trial of this 
experiment a digit is displayed on the screen for you to classify by pressing the left or right 
key. These numbers will appear on circles, triangles, squares and pentagons.  The background 
will determine which of two tasks you are doing.  The first task is to classify the digit as ODD 
or EVEN if the background is a SQUARE or CIRCLE.  
If the digit is ODD (e.g. 3), please press the LEFT key.  
If the digit is EVEN (e.g. 4), please press the RIGHT key.  
The second task is to classify the digit as LOW (less than 5) or HIGH (greater than 5) if the 
background is a TRIANGLE or PENTAGON.  
If the digit is LOW (e.g. 3), please press the LEFT key.  
If the digit is HIGH (e.g. 8) please press the RIGHT key. 
You should try to respond to each digit as quickly as you can, while avoiding errors. Shortly 
after you press a key, the next digit will appear. If you press the wrong key, "WRONG" will 
appear on the screen.  The experiment will consist of 14 blocks.  The first two blocks are 
practice blocks for you to try to learn the tasks.  Press any key to continue.”   
In the CSR condition participants were given the following instructions:  
“Welcome!  You should have the index fingers of your left and right hands resting on the 
marked "z" and "/" keys - we will call these the LEFT and RIGHT keys.  On each trial of this 
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experiment a digit is displayed on the screen for you to classify by pressing the left or right 
key. Only four digits will be used in the following blocks 2,3,6,9. These numbers will appear 
on circles, triangles, squares and pentagons.  As you go through the experiment you can 
gradually learn to respond on the basis of a small set of "rules" or "pairings" for example:  
Hexagon + 0 = RIGHT   
With only 4 digits, there are not many such pairings.  You should try to respond to each digit 
as quickly as you can, while avoiding errors. Shortly after you press a key, the next digit will 
appear. If you press the wrong key, "WRONG" will appear on the screen.  The first two 
blocks are practice blocks for you to try to learn the mappings.  Press any key to continue.”       
 
Forrest Monsell & McLaren 
 68 
Table 1 
Examples of task pairs with small stimulus sets used in task-cuing experiments 
Stimuli Tasks  Cues References 
8 digits Classify odd/even 
or high/low  
Words (“parity”, 
“magnitude”) or arbitrary 
letters, shapes or colours.   
Monsell, Sumner 
and Waters (2003) 
Logan and 
Bundesen (2003) 
Schuch and Koch 
(2003) 
16 coloured shapes Identify colour or 
shape  
Words ("colour", "shape") 
and pictorial cues.  
Monsell and 
Mizon (2006) 
Expts 4 and 5. 
A smiley face in one 
of four quadrants. 
Classify as 
above/below, or 
left/right of, centre. 
Arrow cues indicating 
relevant dimension. 
Meiran (1996) 
4 rectangles Classify by height 
or width. 
Cues are the letters “h” or 
“w” 
Altmann (2004) 
8 letters coloured red 
or blue. 
Classify vowel/ 
consonant or 
red/blue 
Stimulus position in a 2 
by 2 grid. 
De Jong (2000) 
4 or A displayed large 
or small in red or blue 
Identify size, 
colour or form  
A double arrow, yellow 
patch or “$”  
Koch (2001) 
6 coloured words Name the word or 
the colour. 
location –top/bottom of 
screen. 
Allport and Wiley 
(2000) 
4 coloured rectangles Indicate orientation 
colour  
The digits 3, 4, 5 or 6. Slagter et al 
(2006) 
8 coloured face 
pictures. 
Classify or colour 
gender  
The words "gender" or 
"colour" with and without 
S-R mappings 
Shi, Zhou, Muller 
& Schubert, 
(2010) 
Letter-digit pair  Classify digit as 
odd/even or letter 
as 
vowel/consonant. 
One of 4 “hot” or “cold” 
coloured squares.  
Jamadar, Hughes, 
Fulham, Michie & 
Karayanidis 
(2010) 
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Figure Legends 
Figure 1. The left hand panel indicates the hierarchical structure of the task-set strategy.  In 
this example, square versus diamond cue specifies odd/even versus high/low classification of 
the digit; the next level specifies the response assignments for the selected classification. The 
right hand panel indicates the "flat” structure of the cue + stimulus-> response strategy, as 
instructed/trained in the CSR condition, with no mention of tasks.  These diagrams were used 
as the instruction sheets for Experiment 2.   
 
Figure 2. The means of median correct RTs and error% over successive block pairs in 
Experiment 1 for each combination of congruent/incongruent stimuli and “switch”/ “repeat” 
trials (as specified for the Tasks condition). Darker dotted lines represent switch trials, lighter 
solid lines repeat trials.  Square symbols represent congruent trials, diamonds represent 
incongruent trials.  The breaks in the lines mark transfer to a new stimulus set for block pairs 
6 and 7. The left hand panel shows results for the CSR condition; the right hand panel shows 
the results for those participants in the Tasks condition. 
 
Figure 3.  Contrasts indicating three principal findings of Experiment 1. Reaction time 
contrasts are shown in the upper panels, error rate contrasts in the lower panels.   The three 
panels show the interaction of instruction condition (Tasks versus CSR) with: (left panel) the 
effects of a task switch [as specified for the Tasks group]; (middle panel) the reduction in 
switch cost with increasing CSI; (right panel) the effect of response congruence. 
 
Figure 4. The means of median correct RTs and error  % over successive block pairs in 
Experiment 2, plotted as in Figure 2.   
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Figure 5.  Contrasts indicating three principal findings of Experiment 2, plotted as in Figure 
3.  
 
Figure 6. The means of median correct RTs and error % over successive block pairs in 
Experiment 3, plotted as in Figure 2.   
 
Figure 7.  Contrasts indicating three principal findings of Experiment 3, plotted as in Figure 
3.  
 
Figure 8.  A diagrammatic representation of APECS.  Black units represent units activated on 
an example trial, illustrating the way in which the hidden units could carry the mappings, 
both to the correct output unit and to the unit replicating the cue on the output layer.  The 
minus sign on the hidden units indicates the negative bias which preserves the learning.  Note 
that more input, hidden and output units were used in the actual simulations.   
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 Figure 1 
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Figure 8 
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